In this paper, I address the problem of “reality” within semiotic theory by proposing a conceptual distinction between reality and world from an ethnosemiotic perspective. Starting from the epistemological foundations of semiotics — rooted in phenomenology and structuralism — I interrogate the status of reality as an apparently external, unitary, and pre–discursive domain, commonly evoked through notions such as “effects of reality” or the “discursive construction of reality”. Although semiotic discourse frequently employs the term “reality”, I argue that this usage conceals a fundamental tension between an ontologically independent real and the discursive processes through which meaning is produced. Within this framework, I introduce the notion of world as an alternative analytical category. Unlike reality, understood as an undifferentiated totality that “stands outside” discourse, the world is conceived as a singular, totalizing configuration produced within enunciation. The world is not the domain of things as empirical givens, but rather that of objects as values — entities that exist insofar as they are invested with meaning through discursive and evaluative processes. From this standpoint, reality itself emerges as a secondary effect of world–making practices, rather than as their precondition. I then examine the consequences of this conceptual shift for the human and social sciences, focusing in particular on ethnosemiotics. I argue that ethnosemiotics should be understood as a discipline primarily concerned with the constitution of objects through relations of observation and valuation, rather than with the description of preexisting realities. Accordingly, the empirical level of semiotic analysis does not consist of “things in the real”, but of textualized configurations of sense. I conclude by calling for a methodological framework capable of accounting both for the valuation processes enacted within everyday discourse and for those introduced by the observing analyst, thereby reaffirming the fundamentally discursive nature of what is conventionally called reality.