This paper examines the historical evolution, persistent challenges, and possible trajectories of institutional reform in Italy, focusing in particular on the dual issues of governmental stability and the emergence of §§§§de facto monocameralism§§§§. Tracing the debate from the Constituent Assembly to the most recent reform attempts, it highlights how Italy’s repeated efforts to modify its constitutional framework have often failed due to political fragmentation, polarized narratives, and a widespread §§§§defensive reflex§§§§ against structural change. The analysis suggests that these failures stem not only from institutional rigidity but also from the absence of a shared long term vision of reform. In this context, the paper argues for a shift toward gradual, stepwise constitutional revisions, aimed at enhancing executive stability and improving parliamentary efficiency without altering the fundamental balance of powers. Special attention is devoted to the changing dynamics between Government and Parliament, the increasing centralization of legislative initiative, and the implications of emergency lawmaking and maxi amendments. The study concludes that a historically informed and incremental approach to reform, anchored in broad political consensus and careful calibration, may provide the most realistic and sustainable path toward a more stable, effective, and representative democratic system in Italy.