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SAGGI

NATO and its opponents Mobilization and protest movements against the North Atlantic Alliance in Italy during the Cold War (1949-1989)

by ANDREA GUISO*

1. *War and democracy: preliminary remarks*

Opposition to the North Atlantic Alliance in Cold War Italy represented a multifaceted long-term phenomenon, tightly linked to transformations in the international political system and changes in public discourse on the subjects of war and peace. Born as a tool of the Soviet State's power politics in Europe, and compliant with Cominform's strategy to obstruct the formation of an anti-communist political and military bloc, protest movements against NATO took on characteristics and meanings foreign to the original identitarian logic of the Cold War and the will of the parties.

Historically, anti-Atlanticist mobilization thus represents a lens through which one can observe and analyze the evolution of the relationship between State, parties, and society in the politico-institutional context of Republican Italy. This relationship was regulated by an intricate stratification of institutions and norms related to collective security, inspired by political logics and legal principles that were potentially conflicting, as well susceptible to diverse and often antithetical interpretations.

The main topic of this paper, then, is the social and cultural legitimacy of foreign policy and, more specifically, of war as a *discourse on the 'polis'*: as a dimension, that is, within which the po-

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litical community creates a sense of self-awareness, of civil ties, ideals, and morals to be built, contested, or preserved. This dimension assumed an essential and constitutionally relevant role in Italy in the context of the civil war of 1943-45, and more specifically within the ideological and politico-military framework traced by the intervention of the Allied armies and the forces of the Italian Resistance Movement to free the country from Nazi-fascist occupation¹.

The purpose of this study will be to analyze the relationship of mutual connivance between war and democracy developed in the course of the republican years, a pairing relaunched through the experience of anti-fascism, and become the subject of a radical politicisation in the context of the division of the world into antagonistic blocs. By breaking the unity of anti-fascism, the Cold War gave indeed rise conflicting visions of the link between war and democracy, national security and the country's interests in the international environment². Opposing loyalty systems led to antagonistic visions of war as an act of the general will.

The idea of placing foreign policy and the right to declare war under the aegis of the people had a long and venerable history. England and the United Provinces of the Seventeenth century, the Protestant army of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the young North American republic, revolutionary France, and the Italy of the *Risorgimento* were, each in its own way, living proof that the glory and power of the State could find strong support in practice and in the "discourse" about modern constitutional endeavors³.

The extent to which the population was to be considered an active subject of the Leviathan was, nevertheless, a question that the

1. Cf. E. AGA ROSSI, *L'Italia tra le grandi potenze. Dalla Seconda guerra mondiale alla guerra fredda*, il Mulino, Bologna 2019.

2. See G. FORMIGONI, *Storia d'Italia nella guerra fredda (1943-1978)*, il Mulino, Bologna 2016; A. VARSORI, *Dalla rinascita al declino. Storia internazionale dell'Italia repubblicana*, il Mulino, Bologna 2022.

3. Cf. L. COLLEY, *The Gun, The Ship and the Pen. Warfare, Constitutions and the Making of the Modern World*, Liveright, New York 2021; J.T. KLOPPENBERG, *Toward Democracy. The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016; J. BREWER, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1989; R. CAILLOIS, *Bel-lone ou la pente de la guerre*, Éditions Fata Morgana, Paris 1994.

republican, liberal, and monarchical-constitutional elites preferred to handle with extreme caution. “Government of the people” was not, for these ruling classes, synonymous with “sovereignty of the people”. Indeed, criticism against the excesses of the popular government continued to be an essential component of a participatory ideal inspired by the aristocratic-elitist tradition of the *patrios politeia*⁴. This ideal was aimed at enhancing the civic virtues of a small group of proprietary and rational individuals aware – in line with the *ancien régime*’s culture of government – of having to promote the cause of the common good through political realism and the prudent exercise of government in an “anarchic” world of sovereign and independent States⁵. In its slow legal and institutional gestation, which took place between the Fourteenth and Seventeenth centuries, the modern State had divided the functions of its governing apparatus with the purpose of distinguishing the sphere of the *police* and the mediation of numerous social interests (*iurisdictio*) from the *foreign power* (*gubernaculum*), a prerogative that was alien to the game of factions and in the service of State security and the defense of its intangible interests⁶.

Classical constitutionalism had substantially recognized this fundamental distinction, adapting it to the moderate forms of power exercised by the “single-class State” (*Stato monoclasse*⁷) and relegating foreign policy to an autonomous space structurally impervious to the passions of the “public”. Distinguishing between the rule of law and of voters in domestic policy and the power of experts and statesmen to act *legibus soluti* in the sphere of foreign policy, John Locke stated that

4. Cf. C. MEIER, *Introduzione: fondamenti nell'antichità*, in W. CONZE, R. KOSEL-LECK, H. MEIER, CH. MEIER, H.L. REINMANN, *Democrazia*, Marsilio, Venezia 1993.

5. Cf. A. GUIISO, *La guerra di Atena. Il “luogo” della Grande guerra nell'evoluzione delle forme liberali di governo: Regno Unito, Francia, Italia*, Le Monnier, Firenze 2017.

6. The distinction between *gubernaculum* and *iurisdictio* comes from the classic work by C.H. MCILLWAIN, *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern*, Cornell University Press, New York 1947 (trad. it. *Costituzionalismo antico e moderno*, il Mulino, Bologna 1956).

7. Cf. M.S. GIANNINI, *L'amministrazione pubblica dello Stato contemporaneo*, CEDAM, Padova 1988.

though this *federative power* in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the *executive*; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the *laws* that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough *precede* them. But what is to be done in reference to *foreigners*, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be *left* in great part to the *prudence* of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth.⁸

With the progressive consolidation of the formal and informal mechanisms of democratic representation (chambers elected through ample suffrage, parties, newspapers, sociability agencies, etc...), the traditional separation between the sphere of *arcana imperii* and the sphere of public opinion, however, started to appear less and less legitimate and justifiable. Events such as the Crimean War or the Second Boer War, the Moroccan crises, the Italian-Turkish conflict, the debates around neutrality during the First World War, and the Wilsonian interventionist proclamation of a new era of international law founded on open diplomacy, were just a few stages of a journey destined to culminate with the *Pentagon Papers* and the WikiLeaks revelations⁹.

The political clash that occurred in the parliamentary rooms and the *piazza* upon the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty constituted a decisive moment of this powerful historical dynamic. It was, simultaneously, an old and a new question for the nascent republican State. Old because it evoked – a little over thirty years after the country’s entry into World War I – the trauma of the “fall” of the *foreign power* in the open, conflictual, hyper-politicized dimension of mass democracy and, with it, the specter of a civil war fueled by opposing visions of the nation and the na-

8. J. LOCKE, *Two Treatises on Government*, Book II, *Of Civil Government*, <https://www.bartleby.com/169/212.html>.

9. Cf. M.S. ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, Longman, London 1993; A. CASSELS, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, Routledge, London, 1992.

tional interest¹⁰. New because the democratic constitution of 1948 sought to overcome that trauma, stating a general purpose – the «repudiation» of war «as an instrument of offense to the freedom of other peoples and as a means of solving international disputes» (Article 11 of the Constitution) – carved in a normative principle unavailable to the occasional Lords of the law. A principle that the constitutionalist doctrine itself nevertheless struggled to interpret univocally, if it is indeed true that one could emphasize its adherence, on the one hand, to an ethical-moral framework of pacifist and internationalist inspiration, and, on the other, to a “realist” logic in perfect agreement with the *natural* right to self-defense, also recognized by other international sources of law, in particular Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and Article 5 of NATO¹¹.

Of interest here is not so much to evaluate the degree of legal coherence of these rules, a task made problematic by the “politicity” itself of international law, as much as to underline the lack of an *idem sentire* about the position and the international role of the country¹². The situation was dramatically exposed during the electoral clash of April 18, 1948, between the pro-Western alignment led by the Christian Democratic Party and the popular front of the Left, dominated by the Communist Party. The outcome of that political battle, in which the decisive question of international

10. Cf. B. VIGEZZI, *L'Italia neutrale*, vol. I, Ricciardi, Napoli 1966; M. ISNENGI, *Il mito della Grande Guerra*, il Mulino, Bologna 1989; F. CAMMARANO (a cura di), *Abbaso la guerra! Neutralisti in piazza alla vigilia della prima guerra mondiale in Italia*, Mondadori-Le Monnier, Milano 2015; A. GUIISO, *La politica dei neutrali. Nuovi itinerari della ricerca tra sovranità, diritto e opinione*, in Q. ANTONELLI, M. SALTORI (a cura di), *J'accuse! 1914-1918: opposizione, rifiuto, protesta*, Fondazione Museo Storico del Trentino, Trento 2022, pp. 273-294.

11. Italy joined UNO in 1955. For two different approach, see A. CASSESE, *Artt. 10-12*, in G. BRANCA (a cura di), *Commentario della Costituzione, Artt. 1-12. Principi fondamentali*, Zanichelli-Il Foro Italiano, Bologna-Roma 1975, and C. MORTATI, *Istituzioni di diritto pubblico*, 2 tt., CEDAM, Padova 1969. On this topic see A. GUIISO, *La costituzione repubblicana. Un patto per il futuro?*, in L. BENADUSI, G.M. CECI (a cura di), *Politica e futuro nell'Italia della guerra fredda*, in «Mondo Contemporaneo», n. 2-3, 2022, pp. 47-72.

12. Cf. F. BARBAGALLO, *La formazione dell'Italia democratica*, in ID. (a cura di), *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*, vol. 1, *La costruzione della democrazia*, Einaudi, Torino 1994; P. GROSSI, *L'invenzione del diritto*, Laterza, Bari-Roma 2017; M. FIORAVANTI, *Costituzione, amministrazione e trasformazioni dello Stato*, in A. SCHIAVONE (a cura di), *Stato e cultura giuridica in Italia dall'Unità alla Repubblica*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1990.

alliances prevailed, elucidated the contradictions and all that remained “unspoken” in the constituent debate around the themes of war and peace¹³.

The discourse of the opposition did not leave room for uncertainties: with April 18 government, a «regime of illegality» was born, in clear contradiction to the values of the constitutional charter and to the principle of the unity of the people as a tacit, and unavoidable, prerequisite to the form of government of the anti-fascist Republic¹⁴. The divisive dynamic of that electoral confrontation, instead, overturned the “centripetal” logic of the grand coalition government between the popular forces – a logic implicit in a constitution conceived as a «historical and political document» of anti-fascism¹⁵ – advancing a contrary, strongly majoritarian logic, which political forces did not hesitate to interpret as

13. See the Togliatti’s speech at the Direction of the ICP on 16-18 April 1947, in the midst of the constituent debate, in R. MARTINELLI, M.L. RIGHI (a cura di), *La politica del PCI nel periodo costituente. I verbali della direzione tra il V e il VI Congresso. 1946-1948*, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1992, p. 526. On that occasion Togliatti declared: «Woe betide us – he warned – if this policy we are pursuing were to lead us to forget the general laws of development of society and the struggle between classes: woe betide us if the policy of class alliance we are pursuing were to make us forget [...] that the situation in which we are moving is determined by two fundamental elements: 1) this very acute class struggle taking place in our country; 2) an international struggle taking place between the forces of freedom and progress and the reactionary imperialist forces. Woe betides us if we forget these two elements and woe betide us if we forget the character of the enemy we face, which is not quantitatively different from us but is qualitatively so: it is, that is, a class enemy».

14. See Vezio Crisafulli – one of the most influential Italian jurists – on the party’s periodical *Rinascita*, V. CRISAFULLI, *Da un regime all’altro (Storia costituzionale d’Italia)*, in «Rinascita», n. 5, 1951; ID., *La costituzione tradita*, in «Rinascita», n. 73, 1951.

15. «Parties are democracy that organises itself» – ICP’s secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, said in 1946. «Great mass parties are democracy that affirms itself, that conquers decisive positions, which will never be lost again [...]. Yet it is not just parties that are necessary. Their collaboration is necessary; their unity is necessary; the coalition of parties to form a government is necessary [...]. For no party whatever, today, can say that it has the qualities and abilities to hold the country’s reins alone». Two years later, after the end of the postwar cooperation, he repeated the concept: «The necessity of a deep political and social renewal existed as a matter of fact and was felt by the people [...]. The necessity of renewal required unity, imposed a policy of democratic unity of all workers’ parties». ASSEMBLEA COSTITUENTE, Assembly, 24 July 1946, p. 290; CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, 1st legislature, Assembly, 10 June 1948, p. 278. Parliamentary proceedings can be accessed here: <http://storia.camera.it/lavori#nav>.

a request for a plebiscite on the destiny of the nation and its international position¹⁶.

It was not paradoxical that this situation took place only a few months after the entry into force of the most pacifist constitution among those approved during the same period in Europe¹⁷. It was, rather, the result of a confrontation between political cultures that – each with reference to its own universe of values and history – never ignored the principles of “just war” and legitimate political violence. Principles that these cultures traced to a *tragic* conception of politics and history, founded on the awareness of the conflicting nature of the reality within which men – constantly engaged in value choices – are called to operate¹⁸. It is quite probable, if this is true, that the basis of a pacifist sentiment was, at the time, nurtured more by the private dimension of the common people than by the ideological and cultural dimension of the ruling groups of parties, activists, and political cadres. The parties’ grip on society and the hegemonic role they played in the context of the post-war period and the Cold War can, therefore, at least in part, explain why the link between war and politics, and between war and different conceptions of democracy, retained for some time a strong mobilizing and structuring power.

2. Organized anti-Americanism (*Forties and Fifties*)

The first phase of mass mobilization against the North Atlantic Alliance (1949-1954), primarily organized by the Communist Party, brought to light all the ambiguities of a protest movement that – though identifying itself as a “struggle for peace” – remained

16. Cf. P. CRAVERI, *Élite politiche e “democrazia speciale”* e E. DI NOLFO, *I vincoli internazionali di una democrazia incompiuta*, in A. GIOVAGNOLI (a cura di), *Interpretazioni della Repubblica*, il Mulino, Bologna 1998; F. ROMERO, *La scelta atlantica e americana* e G. FORMIGONI, *La rifondazione della politica estera nella democrazia repubblicana*, in F. ROMERO, A. VARSORI (a cura di), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione. Le relazioni internazionali dell’Italia (1917-1989)*, vol. 1, Carocci, Roma 2005.

17. Cf. L. BONANATE, *Costituzione italiana: Art. 11*, Carocci, Roma 2018.

18. Cf. R. BODEI, *L’ethos dell’Italia repubblicana*, in F. BARBAGALLO (a cura di), *Storia dell’Italia repubblicana*, vol. 3, *L’Italia nella crisi mondiale. L’ultimo ventennio*, t. 2, *Istituzioni, politiche, culture*, Einaudi, Torino 1997.

firmly anchored to the *continuum* between war and democracy¹⁹. These political guidelines, issued on January 6, 1949, by the *Politburo* with the aim of disrupting the Western bloc and preventing military integration between Europe and the United States²⁰, far from being a pacifist or neutralist option (the latter supported by the Italian Socialist Party of Nenni and Morandi²¹) were a clear product of the “Clausewitzian” culture prevalent in the political and organizational tradition of international Bolshevism. In particular, it derived from a “classist” reading of international relations that hinged on the doctrine of the inevitable war between capitalism and socialism and on the importance of the Soviet state’s security and its geostrategic interests²².

It is significant that in transposing these guidelines into the national operational plane, the Italian Communist Party referred to two distinct but related politico-organizational logics. On the one hand, the legalitarian politics of the *mass party*, which sought to unite, on the social, political, and cultural field, a vast and variegated movement of public opinion that identified the struggle for peace in the struggle for the defense of the constitution. On the other hand, the sectarian politics of the *civil war party* intended to oppose, on a more robust level, the process of the West’s military integration, with the provision of resorting to exceptional measures in the event of armed conflict. This scenario was seriously considered by party leaders from the spring of 1949, but above all after the outbreak of the Korean War²³.

19. Cf. A. GUIISO, *La colomba e la spada. “Lotta per la pace” e antiamericanismo nella politica del Partito Comunista Italiano (1949-1954)*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2006; A. BROGI, *Confronting America. The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2011.

20. Cf. N. EGOROVA, *Stalin’s Foreign Policy and the Cominform 1947-1953*, in F. GORI, S. PONS (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe during the Cold War, 1943-1953*, Macmillan, London 1996.

21. Cf. G. SCIROCCO, «*Politique d’abord*». *Il PSI, la guerra fredda e la politica internazionale (1948-1957)*, Unicopli, Milano 2010.

22. Cf. S. PONS, *La rivoluzione globale. Storia del comunismo internazionale 1917-1991*, Einaudi, Torino 2012.

23. Cf. FONDAZIONE GRAMSCI (FG), ARCHIVIO DEL PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO (APCI), Comitato Centrale, riunione del 29 marzo 1949, mf. 049. See also the meeting of the executive committee of the Italian Communist Party on July 12th, 1950, attended by an observer of the Soviet embassy, in ARCHIVIO CENTRALE DELLO STATO, Ministero del-

With regard to the first aspect, it is noteworthy that during the anti-Atlanticist mobilization, the Italian Communist Party championed constitutional pedagogy, in part through the dissemination of meticulous instructions prompting propagandists to interpret Article 11 of the Constitution through a pacifist lens²⁴. Equally important, regarding the second aspect, was Togliatti's mention, in the Central Committee of March 1949, of the concrete «danger of war», the preparation of «traditional measures» in case of conflict, and the possibility of resorting to forms of struggle «such as could not have been possible in 1915 [...] and could not have been possible in 1917 at the time of Caporetto», with the prospect of «using all forces [...] to turn the imperialist war into a war for the liberation of people from the yoke of imperialism»²⁵.

The two logics, that of the mass party and that of the civil war party, did not anticipate a dysfunctional form of “duplicity” (as has often been suggested), but rather a coherent *principle of reversibility*, linked to the instability of the international stage. The thread connecting them was the call for a *struggle on the margins of legality* (as Togliatti used to define it behind closed doors), destined to materialize in a series of instructions issued to the committees to facilitate actionable plans of struggle by sector. These, in turn, were inspired by a *hyperdemocratic* conception of the political, played out in the contrast between the “legal” democracy of parliament (guilty of determining, through a majority vote, the country's subjection to the will of a foreign power) and the substantial democracy of the squares and the “real country” (which instead sought to expose this voluntary subjugation)²⁶.

These plans ranged from actions of protest and sabotage against the unloading of American weapons in ports to the organization of committees and groups collecting signatures against atomic weap-

l'Internò, Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza, Affari Generali e Riservati, 1950, b. 15, fasc. I-III, serie K1B.

24. Cf. *Appunti per l'organizzazione della petizione per la pace*, in FG, APCL, Direzione, 12 aprile 1949, mf. 200; G. VECCHIO, *Pacifisti e obiettori nell'Italia di De Gasperi (1948-1953)*, Edizioni Studium, Roma 1993.

25. FG, APCL, Comitato centrale, 29 marzo 1949, mf. 039.

26. Cf. A. GUISSO, *La colomba e la spada*, cit.

ons, from processions of war widows at charnel houses and monuments to fallen soldiers to the vast area of "cultural work" seeking to involve intellectuals and artists in "high" and "popular" initiatives aimed at raising public awareness on issues of war and peace. And specifically: film and documentary screenings; theatrical performances and painting exhibitions; activities related to the education of the youth; reading rooms and circulating libraries; until anti-Atlanticist and anti-American reinterpretations of festivals and customs related to folk tradition. Through these activities, the Italian Communist Party attempted to forge an anti-Western political religion, built on the myths and symbols of anti-Americanism, Sovietism, and revolutionary national-populism. This religion readily camouflaged itself in the moral fabric of its adversaries, by virtue of the conciliatory call to peace and the incessant analogy between Americanism and Nazism in order to break it up and broaden the basis of consensus to forces of opposition²⁷.

Work in the army was one of the most interesting dimensions of organized anti-Atlanticism. It constituted a set of propagandistic, organizational, and intelligence activities based on the denial of any axiological connection between communism and pacifism. The guidelines in this specific area of the struggle for peace cautioned activists of the Italian Communist Youth Federation (primary representatives of the work among the soldiers) against carelessly spreading the seed of antimilitarism among armed forces and insisted, rather, on the need to emphasize the identification between army and popular forces along a nebulous *continuum* of legal initiatives "on the margins": agitation and propaganda between soldiers and officers; creation of contact networks with conscripts to be activated in the event of armed conflict between the two blocs; infiltration and espionage to gather information on the deployment of armed forces and weapons, military structures, the number of forces and the location of arsenals; lastly, organi-

27. Cf. E. AGA ROSSI, G. ORSINA, *L'immagine dell'America nella stampa comunista italiana (1945-1953)*, in P. CRAVERI, G. QUAGLIARIELLO (a cura di), *L'antiamericano in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2004.

zation of groups to sabotage industries working in the war sector. Available documentation confirms that those responsible for this activity were also liaising with leaders of the party's clandestine military apparatus, with the objective of favoring, in the event of a breach of the constitutional order, a consistent flow of soldiers from the official army to the armed resistance²⁸.

3. *Old and new anti-Atlanticism (Sixties-Eighties)*

This organized and other-directed phase of anti-Atlanticist mobilization, linked to Soviet power politics in Europe in the early years of the Cold War, slowed down decisively in the thawing climate between the blocs, which had been determined by certain events and dynamics aimed at structurally modifying the bipolar system: the death of Stalin, with the new Soviet leadership's attempt to stabilize the division of Europe and carry out a more eclectic strategy of movement in the global geopolitical context; the failure of the European Defense Community, which would have ended up sanctioning Europe's dependence on American security strategies, in a framework dominated by the incessant development of nuclear arsenals; the emergence of new international subjectivities determined to escape the logic of bipolarism or to exploit it in favor of national interests.

In this new context, characterized (at least until 1962, before the beginning of a "great détente") by a continuous swing of tensions and moments of relative quiet in the opposition between the US and the USSR, the seeds of a profound and radical transformation of the Republic's *foreign policy culture* were planted. This transformation revealed two antithetical interpretations of the relationship between democracy and war or – if we wish to be more schematic – the relationship between Article 11 of the Constitution and NATO's Article 5. What emerged was at first an imperceptible, but then increasingly visible cultural fault line, destined to have a profound effect on the phenomenology and "morality" of Italian anti-Atlanticism, with disruptive effects on the relations

28. See the chapter 9 of A. GUIISO, *La colomba e la spada*, cit., pp. 403-452.

between majority and opposition, between the area “of the system” and that of the “anti-system”, between parties and society.

The first approach understood the international détente – in line with the specular, albeit cautious, evolution of some sectors of the Christian Democracy – as a prerequisite for the détente in internal politics, anticipating a dynamic scenario of “overcoming the blocs”, the premise of which consisted in the preliminary stabilization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union²⁹. In substance, this approach was inspired by the canon of political realism, which would come to facilitate both the gradual detachment of socialist culture from the traditional anchoring of identity to neutralism, as well as, later and in a more tortuous and ambiguous way, the Communist Party’s contestation of the anti-Atlanticist precondition³⁰. The revision of the position against NATO announced by Berlinguer in the mid-Seventies – which overturned the option enunciated until then of “resistance” and “insurgence” envisaged in the event of a conflict between the two blocs³¹ – is to be understood, in fact, within a logic of pragmatism at the service of the Communist Party’s legitimacy to govern³². A logic in which one could observe the beginning of a path that culminated in the first post-communist governments of October 1998, and in the resoluteness with which D’Alema’s government chose to support

29. Cf. G. FORMIGONI, *Storia d’Italia nella guerra fredda (1943-1978)*, il Mulino, Bologna 2016, pp. 295-372.

30. Cf. L. NUTI, *Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*, Laterza, Bari-Roma 1999; S. PONS, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Einaudi, Torino 2006; ID., *I comunisti italiani e gli altri. Visioni e legami internazionali nel mondo del Novecento*, Einaudi, Torino 2021.

31. The theme of neutrality and of Italy’s exit from NATO was reaffirmed during the 12th National Congress of the Italian Communist Party. The extremely ambiguous use of formulas is noteworthy: on the one hand, Italy’s neutrality and the fact it could have protected itself only by staying out of the blocs was asserted; on the other hand, the “absolute” value of neutrality was denied on the basis of the “just war” doctrine, the one that had been challenged to prevent “the Italian people” from being drawn into an “aggressive war,” which by definition remains a capitalist war and NATO’s business. In fact, Longo stated that «if [...] [the people] were to be dragged into an aggressive war – through NATO’s directives, against its will and in violation of constitutional norms – it would use all its weapons to overthrow the regime that intended to bring about its extermination», p. 59.

32. About the ambivalent feature – both realist and identity – of the ICP’s international policy see S. PONS, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, cit.